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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
TORTS-LABILITY OF OWNER OF TENEMENT HOUSE FOR NEG-
LIGENCE OF INDEPENDENT CoNTRAcTOR.-Defendant, owner of a
tenement house, has been held liable in damages for injuries sustained
by the infant plaintiff arising out of the explosion of a percussion
cap found by the infant in the cellar of the premises where he resided
with his parents. The cap was left by an independent contractor
hired by the defendant to do excavation work in the cellar a year
previously. The defeidant contends that he was not negligent be-
cause he had no knowledge of the presence of such caps and the
nature of the work did not necessitate their use. The plaintiff con-
tends that the defendant knew of the use of dynamite and was neg-
ligent in letting the cap remain in the cellar and is, therefore, liable
on the grounds that he failed to exercise due care in keeping the
premises in a reasonably safe condition, and secondly, the defendant
is accountable for the negligence of his contractor when he performs
work which is inherently dangerous. The trial court held that the
defendant would be liable for the acts of the contractor in leaving the
cap in the debris as a foreseeable danger inherent in the nature of
the work, and refused to allow the jury to consider the issue of notice
to the defendant. Held, reversed, and a new trial ordered. The
defendant is not liable for the negligence of the independent con-
tractor in leaving unexploded percussion caps mixed with debris in
the tenement house cellar unknown to the defendant. This was a
mere casual act of performance involving a detail of work; the nature
of the work did not necessitate the use of dynamite. Fragiacomw
v. 404-6 E. 88th St. Realty Corp., 269 App. Div. 635, 58 N. Y. S.
(2d) 109 (1st Dep't 1945).
The Appellate Division found that the overwhelming weight of
evidence showed that no blasting was done by the contractor. The
landlord did not fail to keep the premises in a reasonably safe con-
dition and to exercise due care because he had no notice of the danger.
To be held liable it must be shown that he knew of the dangerous
condition and if he had not authorized any work which might rea-
sonably be expected to create danger, he is not held accountable for
the collateral acts of the contractor.1 Knowledge of the lack of safety
is not imputed to the owner so as to charge him with liability for
injuries inflicted upon the tenant because of a dangerous condition.2
It has been held as a general rule that an owner is not liable
when contracting for work to be done with an independent contractor
for accidents that happen within the course of the work. The ex-
ception to the rule is where the thing to be done is necessarily at-
tended with danger, however skillfully performed, or is intrinsically
dangerous.3 Liability for work done by an independent contractor
I Hyman v. Barrett, 224 N. Y. 436, 121 N. E. 271 (1918).
2 R. C. H. Covington Co. v. Masonic Temple Co., 176 Ky. 729, 197 S. W.
420 (1917).
3 Besner v. Central Trust Co., 230 N. Y. 357, 130 N. E. 577 (1921).
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is based upon the consideration of whether or not the work let out
was inherently dangerous. 4
It is the court's admission that the letting of a contract for work
intrinsically dangerous by the tenement house owner does not dele-
gate responsibility for injuries which he might have reasonably
guarded against. If, however, the injury results from a detail of
performance in the work and the work could have been done with
the exercise of due care on the contractor's part, then the contractor
alone would be liable for the failure to be reasonably careful. 5
The act of the contractor in leaving a dynamite cap in the
debris has been classified as a collateral act and as such the defendant
could not be held answerable for it. A distinction has been made
between those injuries which arise out of an act collateral with the
work which could not be guarded against beforehand and those in-
juries which arise out of work which is inherently dangerous and
where they might reasonably be expected.0 Collateral acts are de-
fined as those involving details of work not ordinarily considered or
contemplated by the employer. This is founded on the belief that
an employer is not to be held liable for the unusual and abnormal mis-
conduct of the contractor's workmen in performance of the work.7
G. P. O.
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUmENTs-CONsIDERATION-PARTLY FOR SER-
VICES AND PARTLY AS A GIFT-DEFENSE PRO TANT.-Respondent
filed suit to collect on a promissory note for $5,000 against decedent's
estate. The Probate Court of Minnesota disallowed the claim but
such judgment was reversed by the District Court of Minnesota and
an appeal is taken from that judgment. Respondent introduced evi-
dence to the effect that decedent and respondent were engaged to be
married, and that she worked for respondent in his office. On June
27, 1940, respondent prepared the note in question at decedent's
office, and brought it to decedent at a house where he was confined,
at which time he signed it. She further testified that the note was
not "exactly" a gift, but that "it probably was a gift and compensa-
tion for my services." Held, affirmed. Personal services rendered
under such circumstances that there is a legal, obligation to pay for
them are sufficient consideration for a promissory note given for
them, regardless of their economic value as compared to the amount
of the note. A promise to pay made as a gift is without consideration
and is not binding, and if a note was given partly for services and
4 Storrs v. The City of Utica, 17 N. Y. 104 (1858) ; Deming v. Terminal
Ry. of Buffalo, 169 N. Y. 1, 61 N. E. 983 (1901).
I Engel v. Eureka Club, 137 N. Y. 100, 32 N. E. 1052 (1893).
e Boylhart v. Di Marco & Reimann Inc., 270 N. Y. 217, 200 N. E. 793
(1936).
7 PRossER ON ToRTs (1941) 490.
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